At the Sep 23 close Boeing is $199.93 / $158B of equity and about $184B of enterprise value. Airbus is €192 / €152B (~$173B) with net cash. Airbus leads deliveries (475 vs 418 through August), the book (9,362 vs ~6,750), commercial margin (~8% adjusted vs BCA still negative), and FY26 cash (~€4.5B guided vs BA’s $1–3B). Boeing is the larger industrial because of BDS + BGS. That is also why the stock can be a recovery multiple while still losing the narrowbody race.
9월 23일 종가 기준 보잉은 시가총액 $199.93 / $1,580억, 기업가치 약 $1,840억입니다. 에어버스는 €192 / €1,520억(~$1,730억)이며 순현금입니다. 에어버스가 인도(8월까지 475 vs 418), 수주잔고(9,362 vs ~6,750), 상용 마진(조정 ~8% vs BCA 여전히 적자), FY26 현금(가이던스 ~€45억 vs BA $10–30억)에서 앞섭니다. 보잉이 더 큰 산업체인 이유는 BDS + BGS 때문입니다. 내로우바디 경쟁에서 지면서도 회복 배수로 거래될 수 있는 이유이기도 합니다.
Convert Airbus at $1.14. Do not mix company FCF definitions without the footnote — Boeing is OCF minus PP&E; Airbus guides FCF before customer financing.
에어버스를 $1.14로 환산하십시오. 각주 없이 회사 FCF 정의를 섞지 마십시오 — 보잉은 OCF − PP&E; 에어버스는 고객금융 전 FCF 가이던스.
| Boeing (BA) | Airbus (AIR) | Read해석 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spot (Sep 23 close) | $199.93 | €192.18 | BA 52-week $177–$254. AIR €157–€221. |
| Market cap | $158B | €152B / $173B | Airbus is the larger listed equity in dollars. |
| Enterprise value | ~$184B | ~$163B | Net-debt vs net-cash flips the ranking. |
| TTM sales | ~$94B | ~€77B / $88B | EV/sales ~2.0× BA vs ~1.85× AIR. |
| H1’26 revenue | $46.8B | €33.2B / $38B | Both up double-digit on deliveries. |
| H1’26 operating / EBIT adj. | 1.3% / $0.6B | 8.2% / €2.7B | This is the profitability gap. |
| H1’26 FCF | −$0.8B | −€1.2B | Both first-halves are inventory years. The year is H2. |
| FY26 company box | FCF $1–3B | EBIT adj. €7.5B · FCF €4.5B | Airbus is already a cash compounder. Boeing is trying to re-enter the club. |
| Credit | BBB− / Baa3 | A+ / A1 | Three notches. That is the cost-of-debt story. |
| Dividend | None | ~1.6% | BA still pays the preferred. Common is off. |
BA shares ~790M. AIR shares 791M. EADSY is the ADR, not a second company. EV uses Q2 cash and debt (latest reported), not a live capital-structure feed.
Equity value and enterprise value, $ billions. Airbus looks cheaper once you subtract the net cash.
시가총액과 기업가치, $ 십억. 순현금을 빼면 에어버스가 더 싸 보입니다.
H1 2026 external mix. Convert Airbus at $1.14 so the bars talk to each other.
Commercial is still not half the firm. That is the whole point of owning BA versus owning a pure airframer.
| BCA Commercial | $21.0B | 45% |
| BDS Defense, Space & Security | $15.1B | 32% |
| BGS Global Services | $10.7B | 23% |
Commercial is 70% of sales and most of the identity. Defence and helicopters are the margin ballast.
| Commercial Aircraft | €23.9B | 70% |
| Defence and Space | €6.3B | 19% |
| Helicopters | €3.7B | 11% |
Dollar billions. Airbus commercial converted at $1.14. Eliminations ignored.
달러 십억. 에어버스 상용은 $1.14 환산. 내부거래 제거 무시.
| Line | Boeing equivalent | Airbus equivalent | Who has the better franchise |
|---|---|---|---|
| Narrowbody | 737 MAX 8/9; MAX 7 certified Aug 3; MAX 10 pending | A320neo family, A321neo / XLR as the 200-seat hero | Airbus. A320 family passed the 737 as most-delivered type in Oct 2025. |
| Widebody | 787 delivering; 777X still paper; 767 cargo | A350 + A330neo. A350F first flight framed late Sep | Split. 787 is the better current cash jet. 777X vs A350-1000 is the next fight. |
| Regional / small | No clean product | A220, rate walk to 13/mo by 2028 | Airbus by default. |
| Aftermarket | BGS $10.7B H1 at 18% margin | Folded into commercial + helicopters services | Boeing reports it cleanly. It is the only BA segment that already earns its cost of capital. |
| Defense airframes | F-15EX, F/A-18, P-8, KC-46, VC-25B | Eurofighter share, A400M, C295, A330 MRTT (91 sold) | Boeing is larger in dollars. Airbus is cleaner on margin this half. |
| Space / other | Satellites, weapons, MQ-25 | OneSat, ArianeGroup stake, Connected Intelligence | Neither is SpaceX. Treat as mix, not as the thesis. |
Spirit AeroSystems is now inside BCA. Digital Aviation Solutions was sold in 2025 — that is why BGS growth looks soft against last year.
The mix is why a “Boeing versus Airbus” screen that only uses deliveries is incomplete. A 57-jet YTD delivery gap does not make Airbus a larger company. It makes Airbus the better commercial manufacturer. Boeing’s $15B defense half and $11B services half are the reason BA can print $24.6B in a quarter while BCA is still underwater.
인도만 쓰는 “보잉 vs 에어버스” 스크린이 불완전한 이유입니다. YTD 57대 인도 격차가 에어버스를 더 큰 회사로 만들지 않습니다. 에어버스를 더 나은 상용 제조사로 만듭니다. 보잉의 방산 반기 $150억과 서비스 반기 $110억이 BCA가 여전히 수중인데도 BA가 분기 $246억을 찍을 수 있는 이유입니다.
The mix is also why the stocks do not have to trade in lockstep. A good BDS year does not close the A321neo gap. A Spanish strike at Getafe does not change KC-46 cash. Price the commercial duopoly on the book. Price the tickers on the mix.
주식이 동조할 필요가 없는 이유이기도 합니다. 좋은 BDS 해가 A321neo 격차를 좁히지 않습니다. 헤타페 스페인 파업이 KC-46 현금을 바꾸지 않습니다. 상용 복점은 수주잔고로 가격하십시오. 티커는 믹스로 가격하십시오.
| Segment margin, latest half / quarter | Boeing | Airbus |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial airplanes | BCA Q2 −2.7% · H1 −4.2% | H1 EBIT adj. €1.99B on €23.9B · ~8.3% |
| Defense | BDS Q2 −0.2% after $280M VC-25B · H1 +1.4% | H1 EBIT adj. €487M on €6.3B · ~7.7% |
| Services / helicopters | BGS Q2 18.1% · H1 18.1% | Helicopters H1 EBIT adj. €240M on €3.7B · ~6.5% |
| Consolidated | Q2 0.6% · still GAAP-loss after interest | H1 reported EBIT €2.75B · NI €2.24B · EPS €2.84 |
Airbus “EBIT Adjusted” strips program provisions, restructuring and FX. Boeing “core” strips FAS/CAS pension. They are cousins, not twins. Directionally Airbus is a mid-to-high single-digit EBIT business; Boeing is a zero with an 18% services annuity attached.
$ billions. Airbus converted at $1.14. FY26E is the company frame (BA midpoint $2B; AIR €4.5B). H1 is not the year.
$ 십억. 에어버스 $1.14 환산. FY26E는 회사 프레임(BA 중간값 $20억; AIR €45억). 상반기가 한 해는 아님.
| FY24 | FY25 | H1’26 | FY26E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boeing FCF ($B) | −14.3 | −1.9 | −0.8 | 1–3 |
| Airbus FCF before cust. fin. (€B) | ~4.5 | ~4.6 | −1.2 | ~4.5 |
| BA cash / debt | — | $29B / $54B | $20B / $46B | paydown continues |
| AIR gross cash / debt / net | — | €27B / — / €12.2B | €23.4B / €15.0B / €8.4B | H2 rebuild |
BA inventory $88.4B and advances $64.1B at June 30. AIR H1 working-capital drain was a planned ramp (€4.4B WC outflow). Same industrial physics: you build the jet before the customer pays the last cheque.
Profitability is not close. Airbus commercial already earns ~8%. BCA is still a negative-margin factory climbing out of 2024. BGS at 18% is what keeps Boeing from looking like a distressed industrial. Take BGS off the page and BA’s H1 operating profit almost disappears.
수익성은 가깝지 않습니다. 에어버스 상용이 이미 ~8%를 법니다. BCA는 여전히 2024에서 기어 나오는 마이너스 마진 공장입니다. BGS 18%가 보잉을 부실 산업주처럼 보이지 않게 합니다. BGS를 페이지에서 빼면 BA 상반기 영업이익이 거의 사라집니다.
Cash is closer than earnings because both are stuffing the line. Airbus can miss a month in Spain and still talk about €4.5B. Boeing has a ~$700M DOJ payment in Q3 and a delivery year that cooled in July (53) and August (51). The $1–3B guide is a Q4 statement.
둘 다 라인을 채우는 중이라 현금이 이익보다 가깝습니다. 에어버스는 스페인에서 한 달을 놓쳐도 여전히 €45억을 말할 수 있습니다. 보잉은 Q3에 DOJ ~$7억 지급과 7월(53)·8월(51)에 식은 인도 해가 있습니다. $10–30억 가이던스는 4분기 진술입니다.
| Airbus | Boeing | Read해석 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aug deliveries | 57 | 51 | Both soft vs June (89 / 64). |
| YTD through Aug | 475 | 418 | Not 2019. Not 2024 either. |
| Gross orders YTD Aug | 1,157 | 498 | The book is still being written in Toulouse. |
| Backlog units | 9,362 | ~6,750 | A320 family ~7,570. 737 family ~4,780. |
| BCA $ backlog | — | $597B | Company consolidated $715B including defense and services. |
| Rate now | A320 walk to 75 | 737 at 47 → 52 | FAA cap of 38 is gone. Stabilizing 47 is the job before talking 52. |
| Open paper | A350F | 737-10 · 777X | These three jets decide 2028–32 share, not 2026 deliveries. |
COMAC C919 is a China story and a 2030s book risk. It is not a 2026 BA or AIR print risk.
Boeing: Jun 64 / Jul 53 / Aug 51. Airbus: Jun 89 / Jul 67 / Aug 57. Summer cooled for both.
보잉: 6월 64 / 7월 53 / 8월 51. 에어버스: 6월 89 / 7월 67 / 8월 57. 여름은 둘 다 식음.
Do not score 2026 as “Boeing is catching Airbus.” A 57-jet gap after eight months is Airbus running its system. Boeing’s win is that the factory is a factory again. The share fight reopens only if airlines can buy a certified MAX 10 instead of an A321neo for the same mission, and if 777X takes the large-twin slots the 777-300ER is vacating.
“보잉이 에어버스를 따라잡는다”로 2026을 채점하지 마십시오. 8개월 후 57대 격차는 에어버스가 시스템을 돌리는 것입니다. 보잉의 승리는 공장이 다시 공장인 것입니다. 점유율 싸움은 항공사가 같은 미션에 A321neo 대신 인증된 MAX 10을 살 수 있고, 777X가 777-300ER이 비우는 대형 쌍발 슬롯을 가져갈 때만 재개방됩니다.
Widebody is the one commercial pocket where Boeing is not behind on the current cash jet. 787 is delivering. 777X is not. Airbus widebody is the weaker book, which is why A350F matters more to Toulouse than another A320 slot.
와이드바디는 보잉이 현재 현금 제트에서 뒤지지 않는 유일한 상용 주머니입니다. 787은 인도 중. 777X는 아닙니다. 에어버스 와이드바디가 약한 장부이며, 그래서 A350F가 툴루즈에 또 다른 A320 슬롯보다 중요합니다.
| Franchise | Boeing | Airbus | Cash / risk tell |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tankers | KC-46. Book is Boeing’s. Quality findings still eat cash. | A330 MRTT — 91 sold. The export tanker. | Different customers. KC-46 advances help BA’s Q4 FCF. |
| Presidential / one-offs | VC-25B (AF1). Fixed-price self-own. First delivery framed 2028. | No equivalent hole. | This is why BDS margin cannot be annualized off a clean quarter. |
| Fighters | F-15EX, F/A-18. Export and capacity jets. F-35 owns stealth. | Eurofighter share. Future Combat Air System is politics. | Neither is the US stealth franchise. |
| Patrol / transport | P-8 (737 derivative). Uses the commercial line. | A400M, C295 (335 ordered / 244 delivered). | P-8 is one of the few BDS products that behaves like a commercial jet. |
| Helicopters | Not a BA headline franchise. | 144 delivered H1, 1,108 on the book, ~6–7% adj. margin. | Quiet annuity. Military + civil + services. |
| Space | Satellites, weapons, MQ-25. | OneSat, launchers via ArianeGroup. | Mix. Not the reason you own either stock. |
FY25 Airbus Defence revenue was €13.4B with EBIT adj. €798M after a multi-year clean-up. BDS is a $30B run-rate with a fixed-price hangover. Size ≠ quality.
UST 10-year 5.13% on Sep 24. Bund 10-year ~3.55%. That 160 bp sovereign gap is the first input. The rating gap is the second.
| Capital structure (Q2’26) | Boeing | Airbus |
|---|---|---|
| Gross cash | $20.0B | €23.4B / $26.7B |
| Gross debt | $45.9B | €15.0B / $17.1B |
| Net cash / (debt) | ($25.9B) | €8.4B / $9.6B |
| Book equity | ~$6B | €26.0B / $30B |
| Customer advances | $64.1B | inside WC / contract liabilities |
| Pension / OPEB (funded status hole) | $4.1B pension + $2.0B retiree health | smaller; European schemes |
| Hybrid / other | Mandatory convertible pref. ~$86M / qtr | Ordinary dividend ~€3.20 run-rate |
| Debt / EV | ~14% net debt | net cash — WACC ≈ cost of equity |
BA YE25 coupon stack still had ~$19B of 5.71–6.63% paper and ~$5B of 6.86–8.75% paper from the 2020–21 issuance window. That is why a 5% Treasury does not refinance BA cheaply. New BA senior unsecured would price closer to 6% than to 4%.
| Cost of capital — MajorHolders build | Boeing | Airbus |
|---|---|---|
| Risk-free | UST 10y 5.13% | Bund 10y 3.55% (EUR books) |
| Equity beta (5y) | ~1.21 | ~1.15 |
| ERP used | 4.5% | 5.0% (EUR, slightly wider) |
| Cost of equity | ~10.6% | ~9.3% EUR · ~10.5% USD-hedged |
| Pretax cost of debt | ~5.6% blended · ~6.0% new issue | ~3.2–3.8% EUR A+ · ~4.8% USD equivalent |
| Tax shield | Mostly unused (loss years) | ~27% guided rate — real |
| After-tax Kd | ~5.6% (no shield) | ~2.4–2.8% EUR |
| WACC | ~9.8–10.2% | ~8.0–8.5% EUR · ~9.0% USD |
WACC is We×Ke + Wd×Kd×(1−t) on market weights. BA EV mix is ~86% equity / 14% net debt. AIR is financed with equity and a net-cash buffer, so WACC collapses toward Ke. USD WACC for Airbus adds the sovereign gap back if you discount dollar cash flows.
Percent. New-issue BA debt is the bar that matters if Chicago has to term out again before BCA is mid-single-digit margin.
퍼센트. BCA가 중단위 한 자릿수 마진 전에 시카고가 다시 만기 연장해야 한다면 신규 발행 BA 부채가 중요한 막대.
The 5–6% rate regime is not symmetrical. Airbus funded the last decade in euros at A-series spreads over a 3-handle Bund. Its problem in this tape is translation (a strong dollar used to help dollar revenues; a 1.14 euro is manageable) and the opportunity cost of holding €23B of cash that now actually earns something. That is a rich-company problem.
5–6% 금리 체제는 대칭이 아닙니다. 에어버스는 지난 10년을 3핸들 분트 위 A등급 스프레드의 유로로 조달했습니다. 이 테이프에서 문제는 환산(강달러는 달러 매출에 도움이 됐음; 1.14 유로는 감당 가능)과 이제 실제로 이자를 받는 €230억 현금 보유 기회비용입니다. 부자 회사의 문제입니다.
Boeing’s problem is a $46B stack issued when the company had no choice. Interest is $2.6B TTM against $156M of Q2 EBIT. Coverage is a rounding error. Every year BA stays at BBB−, refinancing that 2020–21 high-coupon paper costs 5.5–6.5% instead of the 3% coupons sitting in the pre-2020 layer. Debt paydown of $8.4B in H1 is the right capital-allocation move. It is also why cash fell from $29B at YE25 to $20B — the fortress was used to shrink the coupon, not to fund a dividend.
보잉의 문제는 선택의 여지가 없을 때 발행한 $460억 부채입니다. 이자는 TTM $26억 대 Q2 EBIT $1.56억. 커버리지는 반올림 오차입니다. BA가 BBB−에 머무는 해마다 2020–21 고유동 쿠폰 차환 비용은 2020년 이전 층의 3% 대신 5.5–6.5%입니다. 상반기 부채 상환 $84억은 올바른 자본배분입니다. YE25 $290억에서 $200억으로 현금이 줄어든 이유이기도 합니다 — 요새는 배당이 아니라 쿠폰을 줄이는 데 쓰였습니다.
Preferred stock is a quiet third layer. Mandatory convertible dividends ran $86M in Q2. Treat that as another 70 bp of pretax burden on the common until conversion. Airbus pays a cash dividend instead. Different owners, different claim on the residual.
우선주는 조용한 세 번째 층입니다. 의무전환 배당이 Q2에 $8,600만이었습니다. 전환 전까지 보통주에 또 다른 세전 70bp 부담으로 보십시오. 에어버스는 대신 현금 배당을 줍니다. 다른 소유자, 잔여이익에 대한 다른 청구권.
High · near-dated
~17,000 engineers and techs. First offer rejected Aug 21 (64% / 72% no). Strike authorized ~88%. Contract expires Oct 6. Revised offer: 34% wage funds / 26% guaranteed over four years, 10% on Oct 16. Vote window Sep 24–Oct 1. Ortberg: a strike “essentially shuts down” 777X certification.
Medium · local
~14,000 staff across Getafe, Illescas, Seville, Cádiz, Albacete. Intermittent then broader strikes since July 1 over pay and site time. Ministry-mediated proposal (IPC catch-up 7.95% over four years) goes to a binding referendum — court-delayed from Sep 24–25, now likely Oct 1–2. Spain builds military transports and commercial aerostructures, not the entire A320 line.
| Labor map | Boeing | Airbus |
|---|---|---|
| Shop floor | IAM 751 settled in 2024 after a 53-day strike that helped produce the −$14B FCF year. Next IAM reopen is the 2028 problem, not the 2026 problem. | Multi-country works councils. France and Germany are the volume sites. Spain is the live dispute. |
| White collar | SPEEA is the live wire. Engineers sit on MAX 10 and 777X certification packages. | No single US-style craft union that can halt type certification. |
| What a miss costs | 2024 IAM strike is the template: deliveries freeze, inventory rises, FCF goes to double-digit billions negative. | Spain can slip A400M / C295 / some aerostructures. It does not freeze Hamburg and Toulouse. |
| Leverage | SPEEA knows BA cannot afford another stopped year. That is why the second offer moved. | Company can wait out a country. Unions can still dent the 870-jet year around the edges. |
Rank the non-labor risks the same way the stocks are priced — commercial paper first, cash second, defense third.
비노동 리스크도 주식이 가격되는 방식과 같이 순위를 매기십시오 — 상용 서류가 첫째, 현금이 둘째, 방산이 셋째.
BA-1 737-10 / 777X slip
MAX 7 ATC Aug 3. MAX 10 flight-test complete Jul 29; “very soon” still means FAA paper. 777X testing may spill into 2027. Every quarter of slip is another quarter the A321neo books the 200-seat mission.
BA-2 Q4 has to finish the $1–3B year
July 53 / August 51, a ~$700M DOJ check in Q3, inventory at $88B. If September stays at 50 jets, Q4 has to do disproportionate work. A miss reprices the multiple faster than a SPEEA headline.
BA-3 VC-25B and fixed-price BDS
$280M more in Q2. First delivery framed 2028. This is how a $7.5B defense quarter prints −0.2%. The charge can recur. It does not change 737 rate.
AIR-1 Supply chain and the 870-jet year
Guidance assumes no extra trade, traffic, supply or internal shocks, and includes current tariffs. Engine availability (P&W on some A320neo) and Spain are the two live operational dents. Rate-75 is a 2027–28 story.
AIR-2 Dollar and hedge book
Jets are dollar products, accounts are euro. H1 called out a less favourable hedge rate. At $1.14 the translation is not an emergency. A slide toward $1.20 would be.
Both COMAC / China book
C919 volume is still a rounding error against 418 Boeing deliveries. Treat as a 2030s narrowbody-share risk, not a 2026 earnings risk. China orders can still swing a single month’s gross for Airbus.
BA-4 Quality / regulatory overhang
The FAA cap is gone. The memory is not. Another in-service event would not look like 2019 economically — the book is already Airbus-heavy — but it would freeze rate 52 and the multiple.
AIR-3 Defence program clean-up relapse
A400M is quieter after the 2025 contract amendment. Space Systems can still write a charge. H1 Defence margin of 7.7% is the good version of this business.
| Multiple | Boeing | Airbus | Why it lies / doesn’t왜 거짓말 / 아닌지 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Price / book | ~26× | ~6× | BA book equity is a rounding error after a decade of losses. Ignore P/B on BA. |
| Trailing P/E | not useful | ~26× | BA still GAAP-lossy after interest and preferred. AIR is a real earnings yield of ~4%. |
| Forward P/E (street) | triple-digit | ~24× | BA earnings inflection is 2027–28. Do not underwrite 2026 EPS. |
| EV / FY26E EBIT | n.m. (near-zero EBIT) | ~19× on €7.5B | This is the cleanest Airbus earnings multiple. |
| EV / FY26E FCF | ~90× on $2B | ~32× on €4.5B | BA is priced on 2028 FCF of ~$6–9B, not on this year’s box. |
| FCF yield on equity | 1.3% | 3.0% + 1.6% div | Spread of ~330 bp before you argue growth. |
| Street 12-month PT | ~$275 | EADSY ~$62 · ~+12% | BA implied +38% is the recovery premium. AIR is a quality compounder with less torque. |
MajorHolders nine-year framework (Sep 18 book): BA base CAGR 7–10% off $198.20. That path needs BCA mid-single-digit margin and no new lost decade on paper. Airbus is not in the seven-name book; on these numbers it screens as the lower-vol way to own the same narrowbody upcycle.
EV / guided FCF. BA uses the $2B midpoint. AIR uses €4.5B at $1.14.
EV / 가이던스 FCF. BA는 $20억 중간값. AIR는 €45억을 $1.14로.
| MajorHolders frame | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| BA — what has to be true | SPEEA walks, MAX 10 slips past 2027, Q4 misses, FCF < $1B | Vote lands, 737 holds 47, FCF ~$1.8B, MAX 10 in 2027 | Rate 52 + certified MAX 10, BCA mid-single-digit in 2027, FCF $6B+ |
| BA — equity value logic | Multiple compresses toward 1.4× sales · mid-$140s | Holds ~2× sales as the factory works · $200–230 | Street $275 becomes the lower bound once 2028 cash is visible |
| AIR — what has to be true | Spain spreads, 870 missed hard, Defence charge, euro spikes | 870-ish, €7.5B / €4.5B delivered, Spain contained | Rate-75 visible, Defence holds 7%+, mid-term €12–13B EBIT adj. path intact |
| AIR — equity value logic | 1.5× sales · high-€150s | Holds ~2× sales / ~24× fwd · €190–210 | Re-rates with the 2029 EBIT box · mid-€230s |
Not targets. Scenarios so a holder can see which tape they are underwriting. BA at $200 is a 2028 cash call. AIR at €192 is a 2026 cash bond with an option on rate 75 and European defence.
If you can only own one airframer, the comparison is not “who builds more jets this year.” It is who already earns the cost of capital. Airbus does, on an A-rated, net-cash balance sheet, with a 3% FCF yield and a dividend. Boeing does not, yet. The $200 price is the market’s statement that BCA will. That statement has been right before. It was also very expensive when it was wrong in 2019–24.
항공기 제조사 하나만 소유할 수 있다면, 비교는 “올해 누가 더 많이 짓는가”가 아닙니다. 누가 이미 자본비용을 버는가입니다. 에어버스는 A등급·순현금 대차대조표에서 FCF 수익률 3%와 배당으로 그렇게 합니다. 보잉은 아직 아닙니다. $200 가격은 BCA가 그렇게 할 것이라는 시장의 진술입니다. 그 진술은 전에 맞았습니다. 2019–24에 틀렸을 때는 매우 비싸기도 했습니다.
A pair trade that shorts Airbus to fund Boeing is a bet that MAX 10 + 777X reopen share faster than Airbus compounds the A320 book. The order tape through August (1,157 vs 498) does not support that bet today. Own Boeing as a recovery industrial with a defense option. Own Airbus as the commercial annuity. Mixing the two into one “aerospace” sleeve hides the only fact that matters for the next three years: one of these companies already prints cash through a 5% Treasury market. The other is trying to.
에어버스를 숏하고 보잉을 사는 페어 트레이드는 MAX 10 + 777X가 에어버스의 A320 장부 복리보다 빨리 점유율을 재개방한다는 베팅입니다. 8월까지의 수주 테이프(1,157 vs 498)는 오늘 그 베팅을 지지하지 않습니다. 보잉은 방산 옵션이 있는 회복 산업주로, 에어버스는 상용 연금으로 소유하십시오. 둘을 하나의 “항공우주” 슬리브로 섞으면 다음 3년에 중요한 유일한 사실이 가려집니다: 이 회사들 중 하나는 이미 국채 5% 시장을 뚫고 현금을 찍습니다. 다른 하나는 그러려고 합니다.
BA Q3 estimate →BA Q3 추정치 → BA cash flow →BA 현금흐름 → BA landscape →BA 경쟁 지형 → BA risk book →BA 리스크 북 → BA ownership →BA 소유권 →